VIEWS AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS REGARDING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: AN
ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF KEY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
John Villasenor1
ABSTRACT
This Essay presents and analyzes results from an August 2017 survey of
1,500 current students at U.S. four-year colleges and universities regarding
freedom of expression under the First Amendment. The survey was designed
to enable an examination of those views in light of key Supreme Court precedents on issues including “true threats,” incitements to imminent lawless
action, and defamation. The results indicate that the common stereotype—
that students have an overly narrow view of First Amendment freedoms—
while correct in some respects, is also an oversimplification. A more accurate characterization is that many students hold views on freedom of expression that are inconsistent with the scope of the First Amendment—
overly narrow in relation to expression that they deem offensive, but overly
broad in relation to defamation and incitements to imminent lawless action.
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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression on college campuses2 has recently been a prominent topic of discussion both in the higher education community and beyond. Anecdotal examples abound of campus events—including at public
institutions that have First Amendment obligations—in which speakers
holding views considered offensive have been prevented from speaking.3
This has contributed to a broader narrative under which colleges are often
portrayed as places where freedom of expression is under threat.
College students’ attitudes toward the First Amendment are of critical
importance in determining the on-campus climate for free speech. Additionally, because today’s college students are tomorrow’s policymakers,
legislators, teachers, and judges, their views will have an important impact
on the broader societal climate for free speech in the coming decades.
This Essay presents the results and analysis of a survey4 that was designed with the specific goal of exploring views among college students regarding the scope of freedom of expression under the First Amendment in
the context of key Supreme Court decisions. While this is believed to be the
first survey designed specifically to explore student views of free speech in
light of those Supreme Court First Amendment precedents, it is not the first
survey to examine the broader issue of perceptions regarding the freedom
of expression among college students. In September 2015, McLaughlin &
Associates conducted a survey (hereafter, “McLaughlin 2015”) of 800 undergraduates under sponsorship from the William F. Buckley, Jr. Program
at Yale University.5 In early 2016, Gallup, the Knight Foundation, and the
Newseum Institute published the results of a survey (“Gallup 2016”) of over
2
3

4
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In the remainder of this essay, “college” will be used to refer to both colleges as well as to universities that have four-year undergraduate programs.
See, e.g., Thomas Fuller, Berkeley Cancels Ann Coulter Speech Over Safety Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
19,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/us/berkeley-ann-coulter-speech-canceled.html; Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Middlebury, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/middlebury-free-speech-violence/518667/; Howard Blume, Protesters disrupt talk by pro-police author, sparking free-speech
debate at Claremont McKenna College, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 10:20 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-macdonald-claremont-speech-disrupted20170408-story.html. See also Disinvitation Database, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/resources/disinvitation-database/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2017).
A short summary of a subset of the results from this survey were presented in John Villasenor,
Views among college students regarding the First Amendment: Results from a new survey, THE
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/09/18/viewsamong-college-students-regarding-the-first-amendment-results-from-a-new-survey/.
JIM MCLAUGHLIN & ROB SCHMIDT, MCLAUGHLIN & ASSOC., NATIONAL UNDERGRADUATE STUDY (Oct. 26,
2015),
https://www.dropbox.com/s/sfmpoeytvqc3cl2/NATL%20College%2010-2515%20Presentation.pdf. See also Notable & Quotable: Unfree Speech on Campus, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
22, 2015, 7:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-unfree-speech-on-campus1445555707.
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3,000 college students.6 In addition, in May 2017, the Panetta Institute for
Public Policy and Hart Research Associates, which have been conducting
surveys of college students regarding free speech for many years, published
results of their 2017 survey (“Panetta 2017”) of 802 college students.7
At least three surveys on the attitudes of college students toward free
expression were released in the fall of 2017. In addition to the survey that
is the focus of this Essay (which will be referred to herein as “Villasenor
2017” to distinguish it from the other surveys cited in this Essay), in October
2017, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) released the
results of a survey (“FIRE 2017”) conducted in May and June of 2017 of
1,250 undergraduates at two- and four-year institutions in the United
States.8 In September 2017, McLaughlin & Associates conducted and released results of a national survey (“McLaughlin 2017”) of 800 undergraduates.9 Additionally, some of the survey questions in Villasenor 2017 were
replicated by The Economist and YouGov in a late September 2017 survey
(“Economist/YouGov 2017”) of 1,500 American adults.10 Another resource
is the set of annual surveys that have been conducted for multiple decades
by the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) at UCLA.11 The HERI questions address a broad range of topics, including some relevant to freedom
of expression.12 Other useful points of reference include a 2010 publication
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GALLUP, KNIGHT FOUND., AND THE NEWSEUM INST., FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS: A SURVEY OF U.S. COLLEGE
STUDENTS AND U.S. ADULTS (2016), https://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf. See also Vann R. Newkirk II, A Free-Speech Debate Devoid of
Facts, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/firstamendment-college-campus-millennials/477171/.
HART RESEARCH ASSOC. ON BEHALF OF THE PANETTA INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, 2017 SURVEY OF AMERICA’S
COLLEGE STUDENTS (May 2017), http://www.panettainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Youth-CivicEngagement-Survey-Report-2017.pdf. Panetta and Hart have been conducting annual surveys of
college students for many years, so there are also Panetta/Hart surveys available from 2016 and
earlier.
KELSEY ANN NAUGHTON, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC., SPEAKING FREELY: WHAT STUDENTS THINK
ABOUT EXPRESSION AT AMERICAN COLLEGES (Oct. 2017), https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/11091747/survey-2017-speaking-freely.pdf.
JIM MCLAUGHLIN & ROB SCHMIDT, MCLAUGHLIN & ASSOC., NATIONAL UNDERGRADUATE STUDY (Sept. 28,
2017),
http://c8.nrostatic.com/sites/default/files/NATL%20Undergrad%209-2717%20Presentation%20%281%29.pdf.
YOUGOV SPONSORED BY THE ECONOMIST, POLL: SEPT. 24-26, 2017, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/qok43jc8xn/econTabReport.pdf. While most of the respondents to the Economist/YouGov 2017 poll are presumably not college students, the results
for the 18-29 age group are particularly relevant to the college population.
KEVIN EAGAN ET AL., HIGHER EDUC. RESEARCH INST., THE AMERICAN FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS FALL 2016
(2017), https://www.heri.ucla.edu/monographs/TheAmericanFreshman2016.pdf.
For example, the 2016 HERI survey included questions related to “tolerance of others with different beliefs” and “openness to having my own views challenged.” Id. at 6.
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on campus climate from the Association of American Colleges & Universities13 and the 2011 book “The Still Divided Academy.”14
As noted above, the Villasenor 2017 survey differs from other surveys
in that it was designed specifically to explore students’ views of freedom of
expression under the First Amendment in light of key Supreme Court precedents. Of course, it would not be reasonable to simply ask undergraduate
students about those precedents, as the majority of students would likely
not be able to answer questions such as “what is your opinion of the 1969
Brandenburg decision?”15 or “do you think ‘true threats’ that are outside
the scope of First Amendment protection should be evaluated using a subjective or an objective standard?” Thus, the approach instead was to construct a series of short vignettes, readily understandable to a person with
no legal background, that would elicit responses enabling a comparison between the perceived scope of free expression and the actual scope as articulated through Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The overarching conclusions from the analysis presented herein are as
follows: First, many students have an overly narrow understanding of First
Amendment protections with respect to offensive speech. This was evident
in the answers to questions regarding topics including hate speech, counterpoints, and online speech. Second, many students have an overly broad
view of some aspects of expression, believing, for example, that, at least
under certain circumstances, defamation and incitement to imminent lawless action are, or should be, constitutionally protected. Third, with respect
to “true threats,” students display substantial uncertainty whether a subjective or objective standard should be applied. This uncertainty is unsurprising given that courts of appeal have reached conflicting conclusions on
this point.
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows: Section I discusses
methodology and includes a high-level overview of the topics addressed in
the survey questions. The subsequent sections respectively address incitements to imminent lawless action and (separately) defamation, online
speech, “true threats,” and several other forms of offensive speech. The
final section offers conclusions as well as some recommended courses of
action considering the results.

13

14
15

ERIC L. DEY ET AL., ASS’N OF AM. COLLS. AND UNIVS., ENGAGING DIVERSE VIEWPOINTS: WHAT IS THE CAMPUS
CLIMATE FOR PERSPECTIVE-TAKING? (2010), https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/files/core_commitments/engaging_diverse_viewpoints.pdf.
STANLEY ROTHMAN ET AL., THE STILL DIVIDED ACADEMY: HOW COMPETING VISIONS OF POWER, POLITICS, AND
DIVERSITY COMPLICATE THE MISSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2011).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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I. METHODOLOGY
Data collection for this survey was overseen by the RAND Survey Research Group (RAND SRG).16 Prospective respondents who answered an
email solicitation were screened for eligibility17 before they were able to
take the survey. Information was collected included the respondents’ gender, city and state of high school graduation, city and state of college, standing, whether the respondent identified as Hispanic/Latino, and type of college (public or private). Participants who successfully completed the
screening process and survey were given a modest incentive payment.
The survey addressed the following topics:18
Question
Number
1
2
3,4
5,6
7-10
11-12
13
14
15
16
17-18

Issue Explored
Views on whether the First Amendment confers a right to defame
Views on First Amendment protection for statements of prejudice
The First Amendment and online speech
Relevance of the First Amendment in the 21st century
Acceptability of actions to prevent speech deemed offensive
“True threats” and objective vs. subjective standards
Incitement to imminent lawless action
Views on whether the First Amendment requires counterpoints
Views on whether the First Amendment protects “hate speech”
Whether colleges should shield students from offensive speech
Political affiliation and views

Because an opt-in online method was used to solicit participation, the

16

17

18

UCLA retained RAND to perform the data collection. RAND SRG programmed the online interface
to be used by respondents for data collection and used Opinion Access Corporation to solicit participation in the survey.
Prospective respondents were only eligible to complete the survey if they reported that they were
currently enrolled undergraduate students at a four-year U.S. college or university, if they reported that they were eligible to vote in U.S. elections, and if they reported that they were 18
years of age or older.
The survey questionnaire is available at: luskin.ucla.edu/person/john-villasenor/survey.
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resulting sample was a “non-probability sample”19 as opposed to a “probability sample.”20 (It is worth noting that a 2016 Pew Research Center report
stated that “[w]hile the differences between probability and nonprobability
samples may be clear conceptually, the practical reality is more complicated.”)21 For surveying college students, online opt-in panels, which is a
form of non-probability sampling, are a commonly used approach. Among
the universe of all possible non-probability samples, there is a large potential variation in how closely, or not, the post-weighting sample statistically
resembles a sample that would have been obtained through the purely random selection from the population of interest. In that context, it is worth
noting some statistical attributes of the group of 1500 respondents to this
survey.
Seventy-four percent22 of the students sampled reported attending a
public institution, and thirty-six percent reported attending a private institution.23 By comparison, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
reports that, as of 2015, seventy-seven percent of undergraduate students
attended public institutions and twenty-three percent attended private institutions in 2015.24 Additionally, eighteen percent of the students sampled
self-identified as Hispanic or Latino.25 The 2015 NCES data reports the same:

19

20

21
22
23
24

25

See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Non-Probability Sampling,
OECD GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL TERMS https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5066 (last updated Aug. 11, 2005) (“[A non-probability sample is a] sample of units where the selected units in
the sample have an unknown probability of being selected and where some units of the target
population may even have no chance at all of being in the sample. Forms of non-probability sampling are numerous, such as voluntary samples (only responses of volunteers are used), quota
samples, expert samples.”).
See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Probability Sample, OECD
Glossary of Statistical Terms, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2134 (last updated
Dec. 20, 2005) (“A probability sample is a sample selected by a method based on the theory of
probability (random process), that is, by a method involving knowledge of the likelihood of any
unit being selected.”) Although the foregoing definition allows the possibility that different units
may have different, known likelihoods of selection, for simplifying the discussion in this paper it
will be assumed that “probability sample” refers to a sample in which all units have an equal
probability of selection.
COURTNEY KENNEDY, ANDREW MERCER, SCOTT KEETER, NICK HATLEY, KYLEY MCGEENEY & ALEJANDRA GIMENEZ,
EVALUATING ONLINE NONPROBABILITY SURVEYS, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 7 (2016).
Throughout this Essay, rounding of percentages is to the nearest whole number, both in text and
in tables. As a result, in some cases percentages will not sum to 100.
Villasenor, supra note 4.
NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-granting Postsecondary Institutions,
by Level of Enrollment, Sex of Student, and Other Selected Characteristics: 2015, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.60.asp (last visited Dec. 13, 2017). It
is also worth noting that the responses to the Villasenor 2017 questions were generally very similar across type of college attended (public vs. private), meaning that even if there was a divergence in relation to public/private percentages, if weighting for that factor had been performed
it would have had minimal impact.
Villasenor, supra note 4.
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eighteen percent of undergraduate students self-identified as Hispanic in
2015.26 Sixty-nine percent of the students sampled self-identified as female.27 Women do indeed outnumber men among college students, though
not to the extent reflected in this sample. To account for this difference, the
results presented here have been weighted for gender to target a fiftyseven percent/forty-three percent male/female gender ratio.28 Gender29
was the only factor for which the responses in this survey were weighted.
With respect to geographic distribution, respondents were from 49
states and the District of Columbia. The U.S. Census Bureau partitions the
country into four census regions, termed Northeast, South, Midwest, and
West. The Northeast has seventeen percent of the U.S population30 and was
the high school graduation location31 of twenty-one percent of respondents; the South has thirty-eight percent of the US population and was the
high school graduation location of thirty-seven percent of respondents; the
Midwest has twenty-one percent of the US population and was the high
26

27
28

29

30

31

NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-granting Postsecondary Institutions,
by Level of Enrollment, Sex, Attendance Status, and Race/Ethnicity of Student: Selected Years,
1976 Through 2015, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_306.10.asp (last visited Dec. 13, 2017).
Id.
A 57%/43% split was used for the gender weighting. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Total
Fall Enrollment in Degree-granting Postsecondary Institutions, by Attendance Status, Sex of Student, and Control of Institution: Selected Years, 1947 Through 2026, DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.10.asp (last visited Dec.
13, 2017) (noting a 57%/43% female/male postsecondary student split as of 2015 and projecting
a 58%/42% split in 2017); see also NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Total Undergraduate Fall Enrollment in Degree-granting Postsecondary Institutions, by Attendance Status, Sex of Student, and
Control and Level of Institution: Selected Years, 1970 Through 2026, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.70.asp (last visited Dec. 13, 2017)
(showing a 56%/44% female undergraduate split as of 2015).
Gender weighting (for non-gender-specific categories) was performed by computing percentages
separately for women and men and then using a linear combination of gender-specific percentages, with the coefficients in the equation set in accordance with the female/male split among
the target population.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf (last visited Dec.
13, 2017) (showing how the U.S. Census Bureau demarcates different sections of the country);
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, United States Population Growth by Region, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/data_tables.php?component=growth (last visited Dec. 13,
2017) (noting the growth of populations in each region). This Essay refers to the U.S. government
estimates of the July 1, 2016 population.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, United States Population Growth by Region, see supra note 30. Given the importance of political socialization in the context of the family, high school graduation location is
arguably more likely to be correlated to views than is college location. See, e.g., M. Kent Jennings,
Laura Stoker & Jake Bowers, Politics Across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined, 71 J.
OF POL., 782, 787-90, 793-96 (2009) (examining how political views in the family affect the children
in the family and noting that “the political views” of “1965 high school graduates” probably
stemmed from their parents and that the graduates’ “own children, socialized in a strikingly different social and political era, were about as likely as they were to follow in their parents’ political,
and religious, footsteps”).
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school graduation location of twenty percent of respondents, and the West
has twenty-four percent of the US population and was the high school graduation location of twenty-one percent of respondents.
With regard to political affiliation, forty-six percent of the respondents
self-identified as Democrats, seventeen percent self-identified as Republicans, and twenty-nine percent self-identified as Independents. Seven percent of respondents chose the “Don’t know” answer option when asked to
state their political affiliation.
In a true probability sample (one involving a completely random selection of respondents from the population of interest), it is straightforward to
compute the margin of error associated with a given confidence level. Even
when there is a non-probability sample, stating the margin of error that
would apply in the case of a probability sample of equivalent size, accompanied by an appropriate caveat, provides more information than staying
silent on the issue. More specifically, it provides information on the limiting
case of what would occur if the sample were truly random—and of course
the more the actual sample deviates from true randomness, the more uncertainty arises in drawing inferences from measurements made using that
sample. With the above caveats, for a perfect sample, if 1500 respondents
selected from a much larger group are asked a question to which about half
of them give a particular answer, the margin of error at a ninety-five percent confidence level would be about 2.5%.32 For a group with 250 respondents (which is similar in size to the group of 261 Republicans who participated in this survey), the margin of error at this confidence level would be
slightly over six percent.33
Data collection for this survey took place between August 17, 2017 and
August 31, 2017. A few days prior to data collection, a neo-Nazi gathering
led to violence at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, VA. This event
gathered national attention and was a major topic in the news during much
of the time during which data was collected for this survey. To what extent
this might have impacted the views of the respondents is of course impossible to know since there is not an equivalent data set collected, for example, with the same group of respondents just prior to the Charlottesville
events. The schedule for data collection was set several months in advance,
so the fact that it occurred in the days and weeks immediately following the
Charlottesville events was a coincidence. While it could be argued that this
32

33

This 2.5% figure assumes a question in which 50% of the respondents pick a particular answer, as
50% is the number that maximizes the margin of error. For questions in which there is asymmetry
in the answer, the margin of error would be smaller.
It is worth noting that other recent non-probability surveys cited herein have also reported margins of error. See, e.g., FIRE 2017, supra note 8, at 7 (reporting a 3.1% margin of error); McLaughlin
2017, supra note 9, at 2 (reporting a 3.4% “error estimate”); Economist/YouGov 2017, supra note
10, at 204 (reporting a 3% margin of error).
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was an inappropriate time to collect data, there is also a strong argument
that that the opposite is true: There is value in measuring sentiment on key
civil liberties after critical events, as history shows that it is precisely at such
times that civil liberties are most at risk of being abridged.34
II. INCITEMENTS TO IMMINENT LAWLESS ACTION; DEFAMATION
A. Incitements to Imminent Lawless Action
Under the 1969 Brandenburg v. Ohio decision, speech that “is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action”35 is outside the scope of First Amendment protection.
The Villasenor 2017 survey explored students’ attitudes toward incitement
using the following question:
Q13: A protest leader, addressing a crowd of angry protesters, tells protesters they should send a message by smashing the windows of nearby storefronts. Should the protest leader’s statements be protected by the First
Amendment?

The protest leader’s exhortation runs afoul of the Brandenburg standard, as the instruction to commit vandalism is certainly an incitement to
imminent lawless action, and under the vignette presented, would likely result in such action. The survey responses are as follows:
TABLE 1: INCITEMENTS TO IMMINENT LAWLESS ACTION
SHOULD THE PROTEST LEADER’S STATEMENTS BE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?
Political Affiliation
36

Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)37

34

35
36

37

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

24%
76%
1500

25%
75%
697

27%
73%
261

22%
78%
431

23%
77%
1116

26%
74%
384

16%
84%
1040

35%
65%
460

See Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of
the Terrorist Attacks on America, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 28, 28 (2004) (observing that “the greater
people’s sense of threat, the lower their support for civil liberties”).
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
In this question and in all other questions herein in which respondents were asked to agree or
disagree, respondents had a choice of strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree. The
“agree” and “disagree” values in the tables present the sum of the associated tabs.
In this and all subsequent tables, “N (unw.)” refers to unweighted N.
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Across all categories except gender, there is no sizable variation in responses to this question, with twenty-four percent of respondents stating,
contrary to the holding in Brandenburg, that the exhortation to lawless action should be protected speech. The gender difference in the responses
among the respondents is notable, with men more than twice as likely as
women to believe, again despite the contrary holding in Brandenburg, that
the speech should be protected. While the stereotype is that college students have an overly narrow view of the First Amendment, the table above
indicates that about one quarter of the respondents believe that the First
Amendment should confer protection on incitement to imminent lawless
action, when in fact under Brandenburg it does not.
B. Defamation
Defamation is outside the scope of First Amendment protection. As the
Supreme Court wrote in relation to public officials in its 1964 decision in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the “constitutional guarantees [of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments] require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”38 The actual malice standard
originally applied to public officials was later broadened to include public
figures as well.39 By contrast, for private figures the standard to show defamation is negligence.40
With that as context, Villasenor 2017 included the following two questions to explore attitudes towards defamation. Half of the respondents answered the Question 1A, and another half-answered Question 1B.41 The
questions are similar in that they involve a restaurant diner subjected to
rude service and who then attempts to punish the restaurant by publishing
a false claim of food poisoning on social media. The difference between the
two vignettes is in the level of rudeness experienced by the diner:
38
39

40

41

376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) with respect to public figures: “Some
occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
In either event, they invite attention and comment.”.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1976): To create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged
publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher
[with respect to the act of publication]; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective
of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.” (emphasis added).
More specifically, 749 of the 1500 respondents answered Question 1A, and 751 of the respondents answered Question 1B.
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Question 1A: A man goes to a restaurant and the owner of the restaurant
is rude (but not extremely rude) to him. The man is angry about the rude
service and so he posts a review on Yelp falsely saying that he got food poisoning from eating at the restaurant. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “The man’s posting of the Yelp review
should be protected by the First Amendment.”
Question 1B: A man goes to a restaurant and the owner of the restaurant
is extremely rude to him. Among other things, the owner makes highly offensive and insulting statements to the man. The man is angry about the
rude service and so he posts a review on Yelp falsely saying that he got food
poisoning from eating at the restaurant. To what extent do you agree or
disagree with the following statement: “The man’s posting of the Yelp review should be protected by the First Amendment.”

In both of the above vignettes, the publication of the false Yelp review
constitutes defamation. Whether the restaurant owner is a private individual or a limited purpose public figure is irrelevant, as the diner’s publication
was published with knowledge that it was false, thus meeting the requirement for a defamation claim even under the actual malice standard. In
short, the First Amendment does not protect the publication of the false
review contemplated in these vignettes.
In constructing this set of questions, the goal was twofold. First, it is of
interest to know what how what fraction of respondents believe that the
First Amendment should give them license to engage in defamation in response to being treated rudely. Second, it is of interest to know whether
the severity of the rude treatment leads to different answers regarding the
respondents’ views on their right to publish a defamatory statement. The
answers were as follows (where “agree” corresponds a belief that the defamatory review should be protected, and “disagree” corresponds to a belief that it is not protected).
TABLE 2A: DEFAMATION IN RESPONSE TO RUDE SERVICE
VIEWS ON THE STATEMENT: “THE MAN’S POSTING OF THE YELP REVIEW SHOULD BE
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.”
IF THE DINER RECEIVES RUDE, BUT NOT EXTREMELY RUDE SERVICE (Q1A):
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

44%
56%
749

43%
57%
354

51%
49%
130

42%
58%
206

43%
57%
545

45%
55%
204

39%
61%
538

50%
50%
211
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TABLE 2B: DEFAMATION IN RESPONSE TO RUDE EXTREMELY SERVICE
VIEWS ON THE STATEMENT: “THE MAN’S POSTING OF THE YELP REVIEW SHOULD BE
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.”
IF THE DINER RECEIVES EXTREMELY RUDE SERVICE (Q1B):
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

45%
55%
751

44%
56%
343

53%
47%
131

42%
58%
225

44%
56%
571

45%
55%
180

41%
59%
502

50%
50%
249

When comparing tabulations between questions 1A and 1B, the results
suggest that students have very similar attitudes toward defamation regardless of whether the diner receives rude or extremely rude service. In
other words, across the different subcategories in Tables 2A and 2B, the
degree to which the diner in this vignette is the victim of rude service has
no notable impact on the responses.
More interestingly, in both tables, just under half of the respondents
believe that the First Amendment should protect defamatory statements
made in response to rude treatment. There are at least two possible explanations for this. First, it is possible that these respondents believe that defamation in general is (or should be) protected speech. In other words, they
may believe that the First Amendment confers a right to engage in defamation for any reason or even for no reason at all. Second, it is possible that
these respondents believe that defamation is (or should be) constitutionally
protected when it occurs specifically in response to having been wronged.
While it is impossible given the survey data to disentangle the two possible
explanations, the broader message is clear: A very substantial fraction
(forty-four percent in Table 1A; forty-five percent in Table 1B) of respondents believe that constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression should
include the right to engage in defamation. Thus, this is an example of another exception to the common stereotype that college students have an
overly narrow conception of the First Amendment: In the case of defamation, at least with respect to the pair of vignettes that were presented,
many students have an overly broad view of the scope of protected expression.
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III. ONLINE SPEECH
A. Level of Protection Given to Online Speech
One of the most interesting and important areas of free expression inquiry relates to online speech. In 1997, only a few years after internet
browsers had begun experiencing wide adoption, the Supreme Court considered the anti-indecency provisions of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA) of 1996. In finding those provisions to be unconstitutional, the Court
concluded that “[i]n order to deny minors access to potentially harmful
speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.”42 The
Court also addressed the broader issue of freedom of expression on the internet, writing that “‘the content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought.’ We agree with [the district court’s] conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to this medium.”43 To explore this issue two decades after
the Reno decision, Villasenor 2017 asked students to respond to the following questions:
Q3: Statements made on social networking services such as Facebook and
Instagram are examples of online speech. By contrast, in-person statements
made by a speaker to a listener who is in the same room as the speaker are
examples of face-to-face speech. Which of the following three statements
do you agree with most?
(1) Online speech should have less protection under the First Amendment
than face-to-face speech.
(2) Online speech should have the same level of protection under the First
Amendment as face-to-face speech.
(3) Online speech should have more protection under the First Amendment
than face-to-face speech.

42
43

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
Id. at 870 (quoting Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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TABLE 3: LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF ONLINE SPEECH SHOULD RECEIVE RELATIVE TO FACETO-FACE SPEECH
Political Affiliation
Level of proTotal
tection
Less (option
15%
1)
Same (op76%
tion 2)
More (op9%
tion 3)
N (unw.)
1500

Type of college

Gender

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

15%

18%

13%

16%

13%

14%

18%

75%

70%

80%

76%

75%

81%

69%

10%

13%

7%

8%

13%

6%

14%

697

261

431

1116

384

1040

460

As Table 3 shows, the majority of respondents hold views aligned with
the Court’s conclusion in Reno v. ACLU that the First Amendment should be
applied equally broadly in online and offline contexts. For example, seventy-six percent of respondents overall stated that online speech should
receive the same level of protection as face-to-face speech, and among the
subcategories the percentages ranged from sixty-nine percent to eightyone percent. This is an encouraging result, but as the question discussed
below illustrates, things become more complex when anonymity is explicitly considered as part of the question.
B. Level of Protection Given to Speech that Is Both Online and Anonymous
Another important area of inquiry is anonymous online speech. In 1995,
in relation to paper (as opposed to online) publication, the Court struck
down as unconstitutional an Ohio law prohibiting anonymous campaign literature, writing in its ruling in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission that
“[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”44
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the specific question of constitutional limits in relation to speech that is both anonymous and online. However, the combination of the 1995 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n ruling, which affirmed the constitutionality of anonymous speech, and the
1997 Reno decision, which confirmed that the scope of the First Amendment is as broad online as it is in other contexts, makes it plausible to con-

44

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
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clude that anonymous online speech should receive the same level of protection as speech in any other context—e.g., whether online or not, and
whether anonymous or not. The responses to the following question, however, indicate that many respondents believe that anonymous, online
speech deserves less protection:
Q4: Some social media apps are designed specifically to enable people to
publish posts anonymously, so that their identity is not published. Sometimes people post insulting statements using social media apps that provide
anonymity. How much protection should insulting, anonymous social media
posts be given under the First Amendment?
(1) Online statements that are both anonymous and insulting should not
be protected under the First Amendment.
(2) Online statements that are both anonymous and insulting should have
some protection under the First Amendment, but less protection than if
those same insulting statements are made online by a speaker who does
not hide his or her identity.
(3) Online statements that are both anonymous and insulting should have
the same level of protection under the First Amendment as insulting statements made online by a speaker who does not hide his or her identity.

The answers are as follows:
TABLE 4: PROTECTION FOR ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEECH RELATIVE TO PROTECTION
GIVEN ONLINE NON-ANONYMOUS SPEECH

Level of proTotal
tection
None
27%
(option 1)
Less
37%
(option 2)
Same
36%
(option 3)
N (unw.)
1500

Political Affiliation

Type of college

Gender

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

28%

29%

25%

27%

29%

30%

24%

39%

35%

37%

39%

29%

35%

40%

34%

36%

38%

34%

41%

36%

36%

697

261

431

1116

384

1040

460

Thirty-six percent of the students surveyed expressed a belief that insulting speech conveyed both anonymously and online deserves equal protection to similar statements made online but without masking the
speaker’s identity. Twenty-seven percent of respondents stated that online
statements that are both anonymous and insulting should not be protected
under the First Amendment, while thirty-seven percent of respondents answered that there should be less (but still some) protection. This suggests a
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sizable divergence from what is implied by the combination of the Supreme
Court decisions in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission and Reno. In other
words, if under McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission anonymous speech
is viewed as receiving the same level of protection as non-anonymous
speech, and under Reno online speech is viewed as receiving the same level
of protection as offline speech, then a plausible conclusion in light of those
two rulings is that speech that is both anonymous and online should be similarly protected. However, nearly two-thirds of respondents appear to hold
the view that online anonymous speech (at least to the extent that the
speech is insulting) should not receive as much protection as online nonanonymous speech.45
IV. “TRUE THREATS” AND OBJECTIVE VS. SUBJECTIVE STANDARDS
“True threats” fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection.46
The Court originally identified “true threats” as unprotected in its 1969
Watts v United States decision, but provided no real guidance on what constitutes a “true threat.”47 Over three decades later in its Virginia v. Black
ruling in 2003, the Court provided a more substantive discussion of what
constitutes a “true threat,” writing:
True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals . . . . The
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and
from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Intimidation in
the constitutionally prescriptible sense of the word is a type of true threat,
where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the
48
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.

The above explanation did little to resolve one of the most important
questions relating to “true threats:” whether they should be evaluated using a subjective or objective standard.49 Under a subjective standard, it is
45

46
47
48
49

Adding the twenty-seven percent of respondents who stated that insulting online anonymous
statements should not be constitutionally protected to the thirty-seven percent of respondents
who answered that there should be less (but still some) protection gives a total of sixty-four percent; i.e., just under two-thirds.
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
Id.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See generally Paul T. Crane, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225 (2006),
(explaining the differences between subjective and objective standards and how those standards
have been applied in the courts through the mid-2000s). For another detailed discussion of these
standards, published prior to the 2003 Virginia v. Black ruling, see generally Jennifer E. Rothman,
Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283 (2001). This issue is also discussed, including after the Elonis ruling, in John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in
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necessary to get inside the mind of the speaker and assess intent. By contrast, under an objective standard the speaker’s intent is not considered;
what matters is whether a reasonable person would understand a threat to
convey an intent to inflict bodily harm. Of course, it is also possible to simultaneously consider both standards.
Readers of the Virginia v. Black ruling who focus on the phrases
“speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit” violence and “intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death” find support for a subjective standard. Readers who instead focus
on the phrase “[t]rue threats encompass those statements” (emphasis
added) can find support for an interpretation that “encompass” means that
“true threats” can also include statements evaluated without regard to
speaker intent. The years following Virginia v. Black saw lower courts issue
rulings in cases involving threat statutes using both standards.50
In 2014, the issue came before the Supreme Court again when it granted
certiorari in Elonis v. United States,51 with one of the two “questions presented” asking: “Whether, [consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)], conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten” or
whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the
statement as threatening.52
However, when the Court issued its Elonis decision in 2015,53 it addressed (and answered in the affirmative54) only the other “question presented,” which concerned whether conviction under the statute at issue,
18 U.S.C. § 875(c), requires consideration of intent. The Court did not reach
the more fundamental question of what the First Amendment itself requires. Therefore, while it is clear that “true threats” are outside of First
Amendment protection, post-Elonis the issue of what constraints, if any,
the First Amendment itself might place on the application of criminal threat
statutes with respect to the subjective-objective issue has not been fully
resolved. That said, Court’s decision in Elonis to require a subjective standard when interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) could be read, at least indirectly,

50

51
52
53
54

Constitutionally Protected Expression, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 631 (2016).
Compare United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (using a subjective standard);
United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005) (using a subjective standard) with United
States v. White, 670 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2012) (using an objective standard); United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2012) (using an objective standard); United States v. Stewart, 411 F.3d
825, 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (using an objective standard); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 330
(8th Cir. 2011) (using an objective standard).
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (granting certiorari).
Id.
Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2011 (2015).
Id. at 2011 (holding that that for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), what the defendant thinks
“does matter.”).
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as consistent with an approach in which interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
without reference to intent could run afoul of the First Amendment. More
broadly, the fact that the Court imposed an intent requirement in 18 U.S.C.
§875(c) despite the lack of text in the statute specifically identifying such a
requirement could be viewed to imply that the Court would take the position that any threat statute must be interpreted has having an intent requirement, even such a requirement is not explicitly present in the text of
the statute. Stated another way, there is at least a suggestion that identifying a “true threat” in a manner compliant with the First Amendment requires utilizing a subjective standard.55 With the foregoing as context, here
is the question that was asked in the Villasenor 2017 survey:
Q12: Consider a hostile statement made by a speaker to a listener. In determining whether the statement should be protected by the First Amendment, which of the following do you agree with most: (respondents were
required to pick exactly one)
(1) The words of the statement alone are enough to determine whether the
speech is protected under the First Amendment. It doesn’t matter what the
speaker thinks, or what the listener perceives.
(2) To determine whether the statement is protected under the First Amendment, the only things that matter are the words of the statement and how
the listener perceives the statement.
(3) To determine whether the statement is protected under the First Amendment, the only things that matter are the words of the statement and how
the speaker intends for the statement to be perceived.
(4) To determine whether the statement is protected under the First Amendment, it is necessary to consider the words of the statement, the intent of
the speaker and how the listener perceives the statement.

TABLE 5: “TRUE THREATS” AND SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE STANDARDS
(REFER TO DESCRIPTION ABOVE FOR CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE OPTIONS
PRESENTED ABOVE AND THE NUMBERS IN THE LEFT COLUMN IN THE TABLE)
Political Affiliation
Option
1
2
3
4
N (unw.)

55

Total
23%
22%
16%
39%
1500

Dem
19%
26%
17%
38%
697

Rep
32%
21%
17%
30%
261

Ind
24%
19%
16%
41%
431

Type of college
Public
23%
22%
16%
39%
1116

Private
24%
21%
15%
40%
384

Gender
Female
24%
15%
15%
46%
1040

Male
22%
31%
17%
30%
460

Although, not necessarily only a subjective standard; it is also possible to require the use of both
a subjective and objective standard.
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None of the options in Table 5 were selected by a majority of respondents. This is unsurprising, given that federal appeals courts have also
reached divergent conclusions on the subjective/objective issue. Thirtynine percent of respondents chose option 4, which involves use of both objective and subjective criteria. Option 3 (the purely subjective approach) received the least amount of support. This is notable because option 3 is consistent with56 the Supreme Court ruling in Elonis, though it is important to
note again that the Elonis Court addressed only the statute at issue, and not
the broader question of what the First Amendment requires.
In addition to directly asking a question regarding objective and subjective standards, Villasenor 2017 included two different vignettes involving
the same threat, but differing in that the intent behind the threat was different. Thus, this question was intended to explore whether respondents
considered the state of mind of the person presenting the threat to be important. Half of respondents answered Q11A, and half of respondents answered Q11B:57
Q11A: Tom and Phil live on the same street and strongly dislike each other.
While Tom is away from home and traveling in another state, Phil posts
something about Tom on Twitter that enrages Tom. While Tom does not
intend to actually physically attack Phil, Tom wants scare Phil by making
him believe that an attack is forthcoming. He sends Phil a private message
on Twitter, saying “When I get back I am going to punch you so hard you
won’t even know what hit you.” Do you agree that Tom’s threat to Phil
should be protected by the First Amendment?
Q11B: Tom and Phil live on the same street and know each other, but not
particularly well. While Tom is away from home and traveling in another
state, Phil posts something about Tom on Twitter that annoys Tom. In response Tom sends Phil a private message, saying “When I get back I am
going to punch you so hard you won’t even know what hit you.” When sending this message, Tom assumes that Phil will know that Tom is venting and
that Tom does not actually intend to physically attack Phil. Do you agree
that Tom’s threat to Phil should be protected by the First Amendment?

56

57

That option is “consistent with” Elonis because while the Court wrote that what Elonis thinks does
matter, the Court did not write that what the recipient of the threat thinks does not matter. Thus,
another potential reading of Elonis, placed into the context of the options explored in question
Q12 and tabulated in Table 5 above, is that the Court rejected options 1 and 2, but took a position
that could be read to support either option 3 or option 4.
More specifically, 751 of the respondents answered question Q11A and 749 of respondents answered question Q11B.
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TABLE 6A: LEVEL OF PROTECTION WHEN SPEAKER HAS AN INTENT TO THREATEN
Q11A: IF TOM INTENDS FOR PHIL TO BELIEVE AN ATTACK IS FORTHCOMING, SHOULD
TOM’S THREAT TO PHIL SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

36%
64%
751

35%
65%
347

46%
54%
131

34%
66%
218

35%
65%
555

40%
60%
196

27%
73%
520

49%
51%
231

TABLE 6B: LEVEL OF PROTECTION WHEN SPEAKER DOES NOT HAVE AN INTENT TO
THREATEN

Q11B: IF TOM BELIEVES THAT PHIL WILL KNOW NO REAL ATTACK IS FORTHCOMING,
SHOULD TOM’S THREAT TO PHIL SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

41%
59%
749

40%
60%
350

43%
57%
130

43%
57%
213

41%
59%
561

41%
59%
188

34%
66%
520

51%
49%
229

For most categories, the above answers show lack of a sizable numerical
difference when comparing across the two tables. This suggests that,
among the pool of respondents, there was little differentiation between the
two types of intent conveyed in question Q11A and Q11B. This is also consistent with the observations from the responses to the prior question, in
which different treatments of intent did not lead to dramatically different
answers. Again, this is not surprising given that lower courts have also
reached divergent conclusions on this issue. This has important implications
for trials involving criminal threat statutes, suggesting, for example, that
jury instructions need to be particularly clear about what standard is to be
applied, and that in the absence of that clarity, jurors are likely to apply
different standards.
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V. OTHER QUESTIONS RELATED TO OFFENSIVE SPEECH
A. Shutting Down Speech Deemed Offensive
One of the recurring stories on college campuses involves student
groups preventing expression by speakers they deem offensive. In some
cases, this involves pressuring the event hosts or university administrators
to “disinvite” a previously invited speaker. In other cases, shutting down
speech involves heckling a speaker so that he or she cannot be heard by the
audience. On occasion students have resorted to physically blocking access
to the event venue or committing acts of vandalism or violence to prevent
a speech. To explore students’ views toward these sorts of actions, The Villasenor 2017 survey asked students to respond to the following vignette,
which was used in identical form in four questions:
A public university invites a very controversial speaker to an on-campus
event. The speaker is known for making offensive and hurtful statements.

Using this framing, the Villasenor 2017 survey presented a set of four
questions, each of which pertained to a specific action aimed at preventing
the speaker from delivering the speech:
TABLE 7: SILENCING SPEECH THROUGH SHOUTDOWNS
Q7: A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY INVITES A VERY CONTROVERSIAL SPEAKER TO AN ON-CAMPUS
EVENT. THE SPEAKER IS KNOWN FOR MAKING OFFENSIVE AND HURTFUL STATEMENTS. A
STUDENT GROUP OPPOSED TO THE SPEAKER DISRUPTS THE SPEECH BY LOUDLY AND
REPEATEDLY SHOUTING SO THAT THE AUDIENCE CANNOT HEAR THE SPEAKER. DO YOU
AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE STUDENT GROUP’S ACTIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE?
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

51%
49%
1500

62%
38%
697

39%
61%
261

45%
55%
431

51%
49%
1116

51%
49%
384

47%
53%
1040

57%
43%
460
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TABLE 8: SILENCING SPEECH BY BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE EVENT VENUE
Q8: A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY INVITES A VERY CONTROVERSIAL SPEAKER TO AN ON-CAMPUS
EVENT. THE SPEAKER IS KNOWN FOR MAKING OFFENSIVE AND HURTFUL STATEMENTS. A
STUDENT GROUP OPPOSED TO THE SPEAKER FORCES CANCELLATION OF THE EVENT BY
PHYSICALLY BLOCKING THE SPEAKER’S ACCESS TO THE EVENT VENUE. DO YOU AGREE OR
DISAGREE THAT THE STUDENT GROUP’S ACTIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE?

Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

40%
60%
1500

48%
52%
697

30%
70%
261

36%
64%
431

40%
60%
1116

41%
59%
384

35%
65%
1040

47%
53%
460

TABLE 9: SILENCING SPEECH BY COMMITTING VANDALISM
Q9: A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY INVITES A VERY CONTROVERSIAL SPEAKER TO AN ON-CAMPUS
EVENT. THE SPEAKER IS KNOWN FOR MAKING OFFENSIVE AND HURTFUL STATEMENTS. A
STUDENT GROUP OPPOSED TO THE SPEAKER COMMITS VANDALISM TO PREVENT THE
SPEAKER FROM SPEAKING. DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE STUDENT GROUP’S
ACTIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE?
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

23%
77%
1500

24%
76%
697

28%
72%
261

19%
81%
431

22%
78%
1116

26%
73%
384

14%
86%
1040

35%
65%
460
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TABLE 10: SILENCING SPEECH BY USING VIOLENCE
Q10: A PUBLIC UNIVERSITY INVITES A VERY CONTROVERSIAL SPEAKER TO AN ON-CAMPUS
EVENT. THE SPEAKER IS KNOWN FOR MAKING OFFENSIVE AND HURTFUL STATEMENTS. A
STUDENT GROUP OPPOSED TO THE SPEAKER USES VIOLENCE TO PREVENT THE SPEAKER
FROM SPEAKING. DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT THE STUDENT GROUP’S ACTIONS
ARE ACCEPTABLE?

Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

19%
81%
1500

20%
80%
697

22%
78%
261

16%
84%
431

18%
82%
1116

21%
79%
384

10%
90%
1040

30%
70%
460

Unsurprisingly, the percentage of respondents who answered “agree”
declines as the actions become more severe. What is surprising is the percentages themselves, with fifty-one percent of respondents agreeing that
“disrupt[ing] the speech by loudly and repeatedly shouting is acceptable
(Table 7), and nineteen percent of respondents finding it acceptable for a
student group to use violence to prevent the speech (Table 10). Additionally, among the four tables, the partisan divide between Republican and
Democratic students is largest in Tables 7 and 8. The gender difference in
responses increases as the questions ask about more violent actions. For
example, ten percent of female respondents and thirty percent of male respondents agree that it is acceptable to use violence in the vignette associated with Table 10.
It is interesting to compare the Villasenor 2017 survey responses to this
question to related questions from other surveys. The Economist/YouGov
2017 survey asked the same violence question of American adults, though,
in contrast with the Villasenor 2017 question, the Economist/YouGov 2017
survey also included a “not sure” option. In the Economist/YouGov 2017
survey, in the 18-29 age group, which is the age group corresponding to
most college students, the responses were as follows: Agree: fourteen percent; disagree: sixty-seven percent; not sure: nineteen percent.58 Thus, in
the Economist/YouGov September 2017 survey, in response to the violence
question, fully a third of respondents in the 18-29 age group didn’t affirmatively disagree with the use of violence to silence speech. In addition, if
the “not sure” responses are removed and only the responses among people in the Economist/YouGov survey who either agreed or disagreed in that

58

The Economist/YouGov 2017 survey, supra note 10, at 90.
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question are considered, the agree percentage in the 18-29 age group is
slightly over seventeen percent of that subset of responses (obtained by
dividing 14 by 81), which is close to59 the nineteen percent number observed in the Villasenor 2017 survey.60
The Villasenor 2017 survey can also be compared to the McLaughlin
2017 and the FIRE 2017 surveys. McLaughlin 2017 asked whether students
agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “If someone is using hate
speech or making racially charged comments, physical violence can be justified to prevent this person from espousing their hateful views.” Thirty percent of respondents agreed with this statement.61 Support for violence in
the McLaughlin question spanned the political spectrum: Thirty-five percent of Democrats agreed, as did thirty-one percent of Republicans and
twenty-six percent of Independents.62 The FIRE 2017 survey asked a very
different violence-related question,63 finding that 1 percent of respondents,
themselves, stated that they might conduct violent action to prevent a
speech by an on-campus guest speaker “with ideas and opinions I strongly
disagree with.”64
The variation in views regarding whether violence is acceptable among
these four surveys is reasonable considering the variation in the questions.
It is expected that a small number of respondents will admit to being willing
to personally engage in violence to silence speech, so the FIRE 2017 responses are unsurprising. By contrast, both the Villasenor 2017 and Economist/YouGov 2017 surveys asked respondents whether they considered violent actions committed by a student group to be acceptable. This led to
59

60

61
62
63

64

The difference of two percent (i.e., the difference between nineteen and seventeen percent) is
below the margin of error reported by the Economist/YouGov, which was three percent for the
full sample of 1500 respondents, and would be larger for subsets. Id. at 204. For the violence
question in the Economist/YouGov 2017 survey, the number of respondents in the 18-29 age
group was 301. This means that if the “not sure” responses are excluded, the number of respondents aged 18-29 who either agreed or disagreed in this question is about 244. Id. at 90.
The foregoing sentence addresses the percentages among the subset of respondents in the Economist/YouGov 2017 survey who either agreed or disagreed (i.e., removing the “not sure” respondents). As a separate question, it is possible to ask what the “not sure” respondents would have
done if forced to choose either agree or disagree. Of course, it is impossible to know with any
certainty. But, it is at least reasonable to hypothesize that if forced to choose, those “not sure”
respondents (who number about 57, see id.) would have chosen agree or disagree in the same
proportions as the respondents who did initially make one of those choices. If this were to occur,
this would again lead to a 17% “agree” response rate.
See McLaughlin supra note 9, at 19.
Id.
The FIRE 2017 survey included a question that stated: “If a guest speaker with ideas and opinions
I strongly disagree with were invited to my college campus, I might do the following” and then
listed a series of actions, and asked students to indicate all of the actions that apply. One of the
actions listed was “Use violent or disruptive actions to prevent the event from occurring.” FIRE
2017, supra note 8, at 14-15.
FIRE 2017, supra note 8, at 15 (stating 1% of survey respondents would engage in violent behavior), at 25 (giving the specific form of the question that was asked).
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“agree” percentages in the teens as discussed above. Finally, McLaughlin
2017 used a different framing, asking whether “physical violence can be justified” to prevent expression of hateful views. This question led to the highest percentage of respondents– thirty percent–agreeing with the use of violence. In combination, these survey results the need for real concern
about the potential use of violence to silence speech. Of course, the proper
response to these results is not to preemptively cancel on-campus speeches
that may lead to violence by protesters. After all, this would simply create
a feedback cycle in which threats of violence would become a standard way
for people to dictate who could, and could not, speak on college campuses.
B. Is “Hate Speech” Constitutionally Protected?
While hate speech is odious, provided that it steers clear of well-established First Amendment exceptions such as incitements to imminent lawless action and “true threats,” it is protected.
TABLE 11: HATE SPEECH
Q15: DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECT “HATE SPEECH”?
Political Affiliation
Yes
No
Don’t know
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

39%
44%
16%
1500

39%
41%
15%
697

44%
39%
17%
261

40%
44%
17%
431

38%
44%
17%
1116

43%
44%
13%
384

31%
49%
21%
1040

51%
38%
11%
460

The relative consistency across different political affiliations in the responses to this question is notable, as is the difference in the responses by
gender. In no category except males did the fraction of respondents who
answered “yes” exceed fifty percent, and for males the number was barely
over fifty percent.
It is interesting to compare the answers to this question to the same
question asked in the FIRE 2017 survey. In the FIRE 2017 survey, 46 percent
of students responded “yes,” twenty-nine percent responded “no,” and
twenty-five percent responded “I don’t know.” Thus, in both the Villasenor
2017 and FIRE 2017 surveys, fewer than half of respondents correctly answered that hate speech is protected. The difference in the “yes” answers
(forty-six percent in FIRE 2017 and thirty-nine percent in Villasenor 2017) is
seven percentage points. Additionally, the FIRE 2017 results specific to the
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subset of respondents at four-year colleges are as follows: forty-four percent of students responded “yes,” thirty percent responded “no,” and
twenty-six percent responded “I don’t’ know.”65 Thus, when four-year college student respondents are considered, the difference between the “yes”
answers is five percentage points, i.e. thirty-nine percent of the respondents in the Villasenor 2017 survey, all of whom are four year college students, answered “yes,” while forty-four percent of the FIRE 2017 four-year
college students answered “yes.”
However, there is a larger percentage point difference between the Villasenor 2017 and FIRE 2017 surveys when students who responded “no”
and “I don’t know” to the question are compared. For example, in the FIRE
2017 survey, twenty-five percent of the respondents (and twenty-six percent of the four-year student respondents) answered “I don’t know,” and
in the Villasenor 2017 survey sixteen percent of the respondents answered
“I don’t know.” One possible explanation for this difference is that because
data for Villasenor 2017 was collected immediately after the violent Charlottesville events, respondents may have had Charlottesville in mind as a
“top-of-the-head” factor when answering questions.66
The McLaughlin 2017 survey also had a hate speech question, though in
different form. That survey asked whether respondents agree or disagree
with the statement “Hate speech, no matter how racist or bigoted it is, is
still technically protected under the First Amendment as free speech.” Fiftynine percent of the respondents stated they agree and thirty-one percent
state that they disagree.67 The McLaughlin 2017 publication did not state
whether the other ten percent of respondents (who are not in either the
“agree” or “disagree” category) declined to answer this question or specifically chose an answer such as “not sure”.
C. Racist Speech
To explore views on racist speech, half of the Villasenor 2017 respondents were asked question 2A, and the other half were asked question 2B
65
66

67

Provided by Kelsey Ann Naughton, data analyst at FIRE.
See, e.g., John Zaller & Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 579, 586 (1992) (citing Shelley E. Taylor and
Susan Fisk, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomena, 11 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 249, 252 (1978)) (discussing “answering on the basis of a single ‘topof-the-head’ consideration”). Zaller & Feldman also provide what they term the “response axiom”: “Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that happen
to be salient at the moment of response . . .” Id. Zaller & Feldman further tie the response axiom
to the “accessibility axiom,” under which “considerations that have been recently thought about
are somewhat more likely to be sampled.” Id.
McLaughlin 2017, supra note 9, at 17. McLaughlin 2017 does not state whether the 10% of respondents not included in either “agree” or “disagree” provided an answer such as “don’t know”
or whether they simply declined to answer this question.
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below.68 While both of the vignettes describe a speaker who engages in racist speech, they differ in whether the audience includes members of the
racial group being criticized by the speaker.
Q2A: Addressing a group of people at a rally in a public park, a speaker says
that many members of a particular racial group are “lazy” and have “terrible work habits.” The audience does not include any members of the racial
group the speaker is describing.

TABLE 12A: RACIST SPEECH WHEN NO MEMBERS OF THE TARGETED RACIAL GROUP ARE
PRESENT

VIEWS ON THE STATEMENT: “THE SPEAKER’S STATEMENTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY
THE FIRST AMENDMENT.”
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

64%
36%
754

62%
38%
345

75%
25%
124

63%
37%
226

62%
38%
556

67%
33%
198

58%
42%
520

71%
29%
234

Q2B: Addressing a group of people at a rally in a public park, a speaker says
that many members of a particular racial group are “lazy” and have “terrible work habits.” Some people in the audience are members of the racial
group the speaker is describing.

TABLE 12B: RACIST SPEECH WHEN NO MEMBERS OF THE TARGETED RACIAL GROUP ARE
PRESENT

VIEWS ON THE STATEMENT: “THE SPEAKER’S STATEMENTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY
THE FIRST AMENDMENT.”
Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

62%
38%
746

54%
46%
352

76%
24%
137

67%
33%
205

63%
37%
560

58%
42%
‘186

57%
43%
520

69%
31%
226

The speech discussed in these vignettes, while odious, is protected by
68

754 of the 1500 respondents answered question Q2A and 746 of the respondents answered question Q2B.
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the First Amendment. However more than one-third of respondents (thirtyeight percent) thought that this speech should not be protected. Interestingly, political affiliation, type of college a respondent attends, and gender
did not result in sizable differences in attitudes toward racial speech. It is
also interesting to compare the answers to the above questions with a FIRE
2017 survey question, which asked respondents “Should the First Amendment to the Constitution protect hate speech?” Thirty-five percent of the
respondents to this FIRE 2017 question answered “yes”, forty-eight percent
answered “no”, and seventeen percent answered “I don’t know.”69 Of
course, the questions in two surveys are different: FIRE was asking a general
question about whether hate speech should be protected, while the responses in Tables 12A and 12B related to a Villasenor 2017 question reciting
a specific example of hate speech and asking whether the speech in that
example should be protected. These differences in the questions are an important caveat to any comparison. With that caveat, the differences in the
answer percentages are notable.
D. Does the First Amendment Require Counterpoints to Offensive Speech?
The First Amendment does not require that hosts of on-campus events
provide an opportunity to hear counterpoints.70 This understanding, however, was not widespread among respondents, when asked the following
question in Villasenor 2017:

69
70

FIRE 2017, supra note 8, at 17.
In a different context, the issue of counterpoints has a complex history. For example, the “fairness
doctrine” policy of the Federal Communications Commission was introduced in 1949, upheld by
the Supreme Court as constitutional in Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), and then
rescinded by the FCC in 1987. See also Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 655-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (upholding the FCC’s decision to revoke the “fairness doctrine,” though not on constitutional grounds).
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TABLE 13: WHETHER COUNTERPOINTS ARE REQUIRED
Q14: CONSIDER AN EVENT, HOSTED AT A PUBLIC U.S. UNIVERSITY BY AN ON-CAMPUS
ORGANIZATION, FEATURING A SPEAKER KNOWN FOR MAKING STATEMENTS THAT MANY
STUDENTS CONSIDER TO BE OFFENSIVE AND HURTFUL. A STUDENT GROUP OPPOSED TO
THE SPEAKER ISSUES A STATEMENT SAYING THAT, UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE
ON-CAMPUS ORGANIZATION HOSTING THE EVENT IS LEGALLY REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT
THE EVENT INCLUDES NOT ONLY THE OFFENSIVE SPEAKER BUT ALSO A SPEAKER WHO
PRESENTS AN OPPOSING VIEW. WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON THE STUDENT GROUP’S
STATEMENT?

Political Affiliation
Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Type of college

Gender

Total

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

62%
38%
1500

65%
35%
697

62%
38%
261

58%
42%
431

63%
37%
1116

60%
40%
384

60%
40%
1040

66%
34%
460

Sixty-two percent of respondents overall (and in all categories, more
than half of respondents) expressed a belief that a counterpoint was required. Some of the respondents who agreed with this question are likely
confusing good event design, which can often benefit from providing attendees with opportunities to hear multiple viewpoints, with First Amendment compliance, which is of course silent on whether a single viewpoint,
or multiple viewpoints, are offered.
E. Should Colleges Shield Students from Offensive Speech?
Villasenor 2017 also asked students to choose what an ideal learning
environment would be. This question was identical to a question asked several other surveys.
Q16: If you had to choose one of the options below, which do you think it is
more important for colleges to do?
Option 1: create a positive learning environment for all students by prohibiting certain speech or expression of viewpoints that are offensive or biased
against certain groups of people
Option 2: create an open learning environment where students are exposed
to all types of speech and viewpoints, even if it means allowing speech that
is offensive or biased against certain groups of people?
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TABLE 14: PREFERRED COLLEGE ENVIRONMENT
Political Affiliation
Total
Option 1
53%
(positive)
Option 2
47%
(open)
N (unw.)
1500

Type of college

Gender

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

61%

47%

45%

53%

54%

52%

55%

39%

53%

55%

47%

46%

48%

45%

697

261

431

1116

384

1040

460

For comparison, the results from the Gallup 2016 survey on this question are as follows:71
Total
Option 1
(positive)
Option 2
(open)

Dem

Rep

Ind

Public

Private

Female

Male

22

28

15

18

NA

NA

28

16

78

72

84

81

NA

NA

72

83

And, yet another data source on this question is found in the Economist/YouGov September 2017 survey, which asked this question and for the
18-29 age group and had responses of: Option 1: thirty-two percent; Option
2: forty-seven percent; Not Sure: twenty-three percent.72 Further, if the
“not sure” answers are removed and the Economist/YouGov September
2017 answers are recomputed only for the subset of respondents who
chose either Option 1 or Option 2, the percentages are: Option 1: thirtynine percent; Option 2: sixty-one percent.
It is notable that the tabulations for this question vary so much between
surveys. Gallup 2016 finds that twenty-two percent of students want to
learn in the “positive learning environment, while the Economist/YouGov
2016 found that thirty percent of respondents in the 18-29 age group want
this (and additionally twenty-three percent were not sure). And, as noted
above, the among the Villasenor 2017 respondents, fifty-three percent
made this choice. There are several possible causes for these divergences,
including differences in methodology across the various surveys as well as
differences in the target population (the Economist/YouGov 2017 survey
was an adult sample, and the respondents in the 18-29 year age group likely

71
72

Gallup 2016, supra note 6, at 12.
Economist/YouGov 2017, supra note 10, at 95.
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included respondents who were not college students). In addition, the different respective times of data collection for Gallup 2016, which took place
in early 2016, the Villasenor 2017 survey, which collected data in August
2017, and the Economist/YouGov 2017 survey, which collected data in September 2017, may have impacted responses to this question (in particular
through the “top of the head” phenomenon in August 2017, and perhaps
to a lesser degree in September 2017),73 though the precise extent of this
timing effect is unknowable.
CONCLUSION
There are several conclusions suggested by the results presented above.
In some respects, many respondents have an overly narrow understanding
of the scope of expression that is protected under the First Amendment.
For example, many respondents indicated a belief that hate speech, including racist speech, is unprotected by the First Amendment, and that the First
Amendment requires the presentation of counterpoints. Relatedly, many
respondents also consider it acceptable to silence offensive viewpoints
through a variety of mechanisms, up to and including violence. Thus, on
these issues many respondents have an overly narrow view of the scope of
expression that is protected under the First Amendment.
Yet there are other respects in which a sizable percentage of respondents have an overly broad conception of freedom of expression, believing,
for example, that incitements to imminent lawless action are constitutionally permitted, and that defamation is constitutionally protected when it is
done in response to being treated rudely. Finally, in relation to “true
threats,” the lack of clarity among respondents regarding subjective/objective evaluation criteria illustrates the complexity of this issue—and suggests
that even if the Supreme Court eventually articulates an explicit constitutional (as opposed to statutory74) position, jurors in lower courts may find
it difficult to apply.75
73
74

75

See supra, note 67 and accompanying text.
The Elonis decision on this issue was limited to the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); as noted
earlier in this Essay the Court did not reach the question of what the First Amendment itself requires in relation to the subjective/objective issue in the context of “true threats.” See supra, Part
IV, at 15.
An additional conclusion worth noting is that while type of college (public or private) was one of
the categories presented in the tables herein, for most responses there was very little difference
between the percentages shown for public college respondents and private college respondents
(in nearly all cases the differences are no more than five percent and in most cases the differences
are in the range from zero to three percent). Thus, while public and private colleges operate under
very different legal frameworks with respect to the First Amendment (public colleges, as government entities, have First Amendment obligations), the results of this survey suggest that whether
a student attends a private or public college has little impact on student views on the issues explored herein.
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More generally, these results show that there is a divergence between
what might be called theory and practice when discussing views among respondents regarding the First Amendment. (A related observation was provided in Gallup 2016, which noted that “[c]ollege students are supportive
of First Amendment rights in the abstract, but many are comfortable with
certain restrictions on those rights.”76) In the Villasenor 2017 survey, many
respondents are, in theory, very supportive of the First Amendment. Consider the following two questions that were also asked in the survey, and
the associated responses:
TABLE 15: CURRENT IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELATIVE TO THE PAST
Q5: EVEN THOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS AND
TECHNOLOGY SINCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT WAS WRITTEN SUCH AS THE INVENTION OF
THE INTERNET, TODAY THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS STILL AS IMPORTANT AS IT WAS IN THE
LATE 1700S.

Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Total
91%
9%
1500

Dem
90%
10%
697

Rep
94%
6%
261

Ind
92%
8%
431

Public
91%
9%
1116

Private
91%
9%
384

Female
90%
10%
1040

Male
92%
8%
460

TABLE 16: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PART OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Q6: IN TODAY’S SOCIETY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS RELEVANT AND AN IMPORTANT
PART OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.

Agree
Disagree
N (unw.)

Total
94%
6%
1500

Dem
95%
5%
697

Rep
95%
5%
261

Ind
93%
7%
431

Public
93%
7%
1116

Private
96%
4%
384

Female
94%
6%
1040

Male
94%
6%
460

As these results when combined with the data presented earlier make
clear, there is extremely strong theoretical support for the First Amendment among respondents, but (particularly with respect to offensive
speech) substantially less support for specific expression that is protected
under the First Amendment. Stated another way, many respondents lack
sufficient understanding of what forms of expression the First Amendment
76

Gallup 2016, supra note 6, at 12.
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does and does not protect.
Part of the solution involves increased education—not only in college,
but perhaps even more importantly, prior to college—regarding constitutional principles, including the Bill of Rights, and more specifically the First
Amendment, and more specifically still, the nature of the freedoms it confers. However, education alone would be unlikely to resolve the divergences identified above between the actual and perceived scope of freedom of expression. Another factor is likely the view that opinions that might
make some students uncomfortable have no place in on-campus dialogue.
This creates censorship pressure,77 and reduces the opportunity for debate
on the many complex issues on which reasonable people can have divergent (and in some cases, as perceived by some people, potentially offensive) views. Efforts to increase tolerance for viewpoint diversity can be helpful in this regard. Furthermore, there is the interesting question of the role
of university faculty and administrators in relation to on-campus views of
freedom of expression. A survey of faculty and administrators would provide an additional important source of data on the broader question of the
on-campus climate for free expression.
As both the survey that is the focus of this Essay as well as other surveys
cited herein have made clear, free expression is an important challenge in
today’s colleges. College students, faculty, and staff can play a vital role in
addressing this challenge by working to improve the campus climate for
viewpoint diversity, and by emphasizing that the discussions that ultimately
end up being the most valuable, enlightening, and informative are not always those that ensure that all participants stay in their comfort zones.

77

See, e.g., the Fire 2017 survey, supra note 8, at 9, stating that “At least half of students (54%)
agree that they have stopped themselves from sharing an idea or opinion in class at some point
since beginning college.” (parentheses in original).

